



NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE

Economic Analysis Division

Emerging Markets Analysis

Quarterly Chartbook

Q1:2022

Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania, Cyprus, Egypt

“The implications of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis cloud the economic outlook”



NBG - Economic Analysis Division

Emerging Markets Analysis

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Republic of Turkey




Population (2021, mn): 85.2
GDP (2021, EUR, bn): 686.0
GDP per Capita (2021, EUR): 8,053
Government type: Parliamentary Republic
Chief of state: Recep Tayyip ERDOGAN
Head of Government: Recep Tayyip ERDOGAN
Minister of Finance: Nurredin NEBATI
Central Bank Governor: Sahap KAVCIOGLU



Romania



Population (2021, mn): 19.4
GDP (2021, EUR, bn): 239.8
GDP per Capita (2021, EUR): 12,358
Government type: Semi Presidential Republic
Chief of state: Klaus Werner IOHANNIS
Head of Government: Nicolae-Ionel CIUCA
Minister of Finance: Adrian CACIU
Central Bank Governor: Mugur ISARESCU



Republic of Bulgaria



Population (2021, mn): 6.9
GDP (2021, EUR, bn): 67.9
GDP per Capita (2021, EUR): 9,879
Government type: Parliamentary Republic
Chief of state: Rumen RADEV
Head of Government: Kiril PETKOV
Minister of Finance: Assen VASSILEV
Central Bank Governor: Dimitar RADEV



Republic of Serbia



Population (2021, mn): 6.9
GDP (2021, EUR, bn): 53.4
GDP per Capita (2021, EUR): 7,723
Government type: Parliamentary Republic
Chief of state: Aleksandar VUCIC
Head of Government: Ana BRNABIC
Minister of Finance: Sinisa MALI
Central Bank Governor: Jorgovanka TABAKOVIC



Republic of North Macedonia



Population (2021, mn): 2.1
GDP (2021, EUR, bn): 11.8
GDP per Capita (2021, EUR): 5,662
Government type: Parliamentary Republic
Chief of state: Stevo PENDAROVSKI
Head of Government: Dimitar KOVACEVSKI
Minister of Finance: Fatmir BESIMI
Central Bank Governor: Anita ANGELOVSKA-BEZOSKA



Republic of Albania



Population (2021, mn): 2.9
GDP (2021, EUR, bn): 14.6
GDP per Capita (2021, EUR): 5,119
Government type: Parliamentary Republic
Chief of state: Ilir META
Head of Government: Edi RAMA
Minister of Finance: Delina IBRAHIMAJ
Central Bank Governor: Gent SEJKO



Republic of Cyprus



Population (2021, mn): 0.9
GDP (2021, EUR, bn): 23.4
GDP per Capita (2021, EUR): 26,063
Government type: Presidential Republic
Chief of state: Nicos ANASTASIADES
Head of Government: Nicos ANASTASIADES
Minister of Finance: Constantinos PETRIDES
Central Bank Governor: Constantinos HERODOTOU



Arab Republic of Egypt



Population (2021, mn): 103.9
GDP (2021, EUR, bn): 338.9
GDP per Capita (2021, EUR): 3,261
Government type: Presidential Republic
Chief of state: Abdel Fattah Said AL-SISI
Head of Government: Mostafa MADBOULY
Minister of Finance: Mohamed MAAIT
Central Bank Governor: Tarek AMER

Date of next elections

- In **Bulgaria**, after months of political uncertainty and two inconclusive election outcomes, the November 2021 elections resulted in the formation of a broad-based Government (led by the new centrist anti-graft “We Continue the Change” party and also including the centre-left “Bulgarian Socialist Party”, the populist “There is Such People” party and the centre-right “Democratic Bulgaria” party).
- In light of the formation of a functioning Government in Bulgaria, we see increased chances for the dispute between the latter and North Macedonia to be settled, and, consequently, for the long-awaited EU accession talks with **North Macedonia** to be launched
- **Serbia** holds triple elections -- (snap) parliamentary, presidential and local -- on April 3rd, with the latest polls suggesting that President Vucic’s market friendly ruling party would remain in office
- In **Turkey**, the recent economic turmoil has significantly eroded President Erdogans’s popularity. We expect political tensions and polarization to increase ahead of next year’s elections

Date of Next Elections								
	Turkey	Romania	Bulgaria	Serbia	North Macedonia	Albania	Cyprus	Egypt
Legislative	June 2023	December 2024	July 2025	April 2022	July 2024	April 2025	May 2026	Oct.- Nov. 2025
Presidential	June 2023	November 2024	November 2025	April 2022	April 2024	July 2022	February 2023	March 2024
Local	March 2024	September 2024	October 2023	April 2022	October 2025	June 2023	May 2024	Unknown *

*: Last local elections were held in April 2008

- **Egypt's** 12-month Stand-By Agreement with the IMF expired in 2021. The authorities are under discussions with the IMF for a new programme
- **Serbia** has renewed its non-financing PCI agreement with the IMF

IMF & EU Financial Support (EUR bn)												
		Turkey	Romania	Bulgaria	Serbia	North Macedonia	Albania		Cyprus	Egypt		
Period		---	---	---	2021-2023 ^a	2020 ^b	2014-2017 ^c	2020 ^b	2013-2016 ^d	2016-2019	2020 ^b	2020-2021
Programme	IMF	---	---	---	---	0.2	0.4	0.2	1.1	11.9 ^e	2.8 ^e	5.2 ^e
	EU	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	9.0	---	---	---
Drawn so far	IMF	---	---	---	---	0.2	0.4	0.2	1.0	11.9 ^e	2.8 ^e	5.4 ^e
	EU	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	6.3	---	---	---
Repaid	IMF	---	---	---	---	---	0.1 since 2019	---	1.1	0.2 ^e	---	---
	EU	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Next Repayments	IMF	---	---	---	---	Starting in 2023	0.1 in 2022	Starting in 2023	---	0.8 in 2022	Starting in 2023	Starting in 2023
	EU	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	Starting in 2025	---	---	---

^a Non-financing Policy Coordination Instrument

^b Rapid Financing Instrument

^c under Post-Programme Monitoring since 2018

^d under Post-Programme Monitoring since 2016

^e bn USD

- Full absorption of the funds available under the **EU Recovery & Resilience Facility** (RRF) should provide a significant impetus to economic recovery in **Romania, Bulgaria** and **Cyprus** in 2021-2027 (lifting their long-term potential GDP growth by c. 0.7 pps, unweighted)
- Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania** and **Turkey** should benefit not only from EU pre-accession assistance but also from cross-border spillover effects from the RRF

Next Generation EU Fund (2021-23) & Multiannual Financial Framework (2021-27) (EUR bn)			
	Romania	Bulgaria	Cyprus
Recovery and Resilience Facility*	29.2	6.6**	1.2
o/w Grants	14.2	6.6**	1.0
Loans	14.9	- - **	0.2
Other***	3.2	1.4	0.2
Multiannual Financial Framework****	52.2	18.6	1.5

* For the loan component of the Fund, the allocations will depend on the demand of Member States. As a rule, Member States can request a loan worth up to 6.8% of its 2019 GNI.

** Provisional data. The country's Recovery & Resilience Plan has been submitted but is yet to be approved.

***Includes amounts under React-EU, Just Transition Fund, European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.





**** Includes Cohesion Policy allocations and payments under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund and the Just Transition Fund.

Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III, 2021-27)* (EUR bn)			
Turkey	Serbia	North Macedonia	Albania
4.7	2.0	0.8	0.8





* Indicative allocations, NBG calculations

Foreign currency credit rating

- Turkey's credit rating was downgraded by 1 notch by Fitch to B+ in March, confirming the economy's vulnerabilities in terms of high inflation, low external liquidity and weak policy credibility












Long-Term Foreign Debt Currency Ratings, March 2022				
Investment Grades		S&P	Moody's	Fitch
	A+			
	A			
	A-			
	BBB+		Bulgaria	
	BBB	Bulgaria		Bulgaria
Non-Investment Grades	BBB-	Romania, Cyprus	Romania	Romania, Cyprus
	BB+	Serbia	Cyprus	North Macedonia, Serbia
	BB		Serbia	
	BB-	North Macedonia		
	B+	Albania, Turkey	Albania	Egypt, Turkey
	B	Egypt	Egypt, Turkey	
	B-			
	CCC+			












Global competitiveness index 2019 (World Economic Forum)

According to the latest WEF's GCI, **Cyprus** is the **most competitive** among the countries under review












North Macedonia ranks 1st in terms of ease of doing business among the countries under review







Transition qualities index 2021 (EBRD)

▪ **Romania** and **Bulgaria** have benefitted from their EU membership, moving ahead of their regional peers in terms of building a **sustainable market economy**






Impact of the Russia-Ukraine crisis

- The **key transmission channel** of the implications of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis should be that of **(higher) inflation**. Indeed, given the economies' **reliance on imports** to cover their **energy** needs (but for Egypt) and **food (grain)** needs (but for Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia), the spike in global commodity prices and associated second-round effects should push the domestic inflation rates even further up from (already elevated) current levels
- In terms of **exports of goods**, the direct impact of the ongoing geopolitical tensions on the economies' under review should be small, reflecting their **limited exposure to Russia and Ukraine**. Still, the **slower-than-initially envisaged growth in the EU**, the region's main trade partner, is set to weigh on the economies' export performance
- For the **economies dependent on tourism**, especially **Egypt, Cyprus** and to a lesser extent **Turkey**, the impact of the ongoing crisis is expected to be much more **significant**. Indeed, with the Ukrainian economy being devastated and the Russian economy due to fall in recession, hit, *inter alia*, by the EU-US sanctions and the weaker RUB, tourist outflows from these countries should be minimal this year, even if the EU-wide ban on Russian flights currently in place is lifted
- **Cyprus** would be also affected by the crisis through the channel of **business-related services**, for which Russia is a key export market
- **Economic sentiment** in all the countries under review is expected to deteriorate significantly in the period ahead, as the implications of the ongoing crisis unfold







Community Mobility (7-day m.a., % change from baseline) & COVID-19 Vaccination Rollout

- Community mobility has recovered to pre-COVID-19 levels in most of countries under review, following the improvement in the epidemiological situation and the concomitant easing in social distancing measures
- Still, the evolution of COVID-19 poses a downside risk to the economic outlook, especially for Bulgaria and Egypt, where vaccination coverage remains low




Real GDP growth, potential real GDP growth, output gap and per capita (nominal) GDP

- **Economic activity** in all the countries under review, but for North Macedonia, **has returned to pre-COVID-19 levels**, with **Turkey, Serbia and Albania** standing out
- The **implications of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis** have led us to **revise downwards** our **GDP growth forecasts for 2022** by c. 0.8 pps (unweighted) in the economies under review but for **Cyprus**, where the revision was much larger (down 2.2 pps), due to the economy's linkages with Russia
- The slowdown in GDP growth is expected to be much more acute in **Turkey**, whose economy has been significantly hit by a currency crisis at end-2021
- Assuming that geopolitical tensions subside by end-year, we expect **GDP growth to rebound in 2023** in all the economies under review, underpinned, *inter alia*, by a strong carry-over effect
- Our forecasts could be revised lower, should the implications of the ongoing crisis turn out to be more severe than assumed in our baseline scenario (e.g. involving physical disruptions to energy supply)












Real GDP (4-quarter rolling, y-o-y % change)

- Following a faster-than-expected recovery in H1:21, GDP growth has lost some momentum in H2:21, amid, *inter alia*, severe strains in global supply chains
- Economic growth is expected to slow down abruptly over the next quarters, mainly reflecting the impact of rapidly rising inflation











Output gap (4-quarter rolling)

▪ The economic impact of the Russia-Ukraine crisis (which comes on top of that of COVID-19), should **delay the closing of the (negative) output gap** by c. 1 year (i.e. end-2023) in the economies under review











Industrial production (3-month rolling, y-o-y % change)

- **Supply chains strains** (particularly pertaining to border controls and a global semiconductors shortage) continue to **hold back industrial output** in the economies under review












Retail Sales (constant terms, 3-month rolling, y-o-y % change)

▪ Rising inflation and deteriorating confidence have started weighing on retail sales












Employment growth (y-o-y % change)

- Following the gradual reopening of economies, **employment growth rebounded in 2021**, yet significantly lagging the output recovery
- Employment growth is set to weaken in 2022, in line with **slowing economic growth**












Unemployment rate (%)

- The **unemployment rate** has broadly returned to its pre-COVID-19 (historic low) levels in most of the economies under review
- **Slowing economic growth** and an **increasing participation rate** mean that unemployment is unlikely to improve much further in 2022




Nominal and real wages (y-o-y % change)

- Wage growth strengthened in 2021, in line with economic recovery
- Strong inflationary pressures, amid relatively tight labour market conditions, mean that **2022 is set for a strong uptick in nominal wage growth**



- North Macedonia and Albania remain the most competitive countries in terms of labour costs in Southeastern Europe
- Bulgaria and North Macedonia have the most favourable personal and corporate income tax rates




Tax Rates (% , 2022)		
	Personal Income	Corporate Income
Turkey	15.0 - 40.0	23.0
Romania	10.0	16.0
Bulgaria	10.0	10.0
Serbia	10.0 – 20.0	15.0
North Macedonia	10.0	10.0
Albania	13.0 - 23.0	5.0 - 15.0
Cyprus	20.0 - 35.0	12.5
Egypt	2.5 – 25.0	22.5
Greece	9.0 - 44.0	22.0

External trade (3-month rolling, y-o-y % change)

- External trade rebounded in 2021, following the gradual reopening of the economies
- Despite the impact of disruptions in global supply chains, external trade turnover still remains elevated, reflecting higher global energy prices




Turkey’s external competitiveness has improved significantly over the past 6 years












Current account balance (12-month rolling, % of GDP)

- **Unfavourable global energy prices**, together with **recovering domestic demand**, resulted in a **deterioration in goods trade imbalances** in all the economies under review in 2021, but for **Turkey**, which benefitted from lower imports of gold and a strong rebound in exports
- For **Cyprus, Albania and Turkey**, this deterioration was more than offset by a **rebound in tourist inflows**, leading to an **improvement in external accounts**












Net foreign direct investment (12-month rolling, % of GDP)

- FDI revived in most of the economies under review in 2021, mainly driven by higher intercompany lending
- Heightened uncertainty, in the aftermath of the ongoing geopolitical tensions, is set to weigh on FDI flows in 2022
- Albania and Serbia remain the most significant recipients of FDI












Other net capital flows, excluding IMF funding and net errors and omissions (12-month rolling, % of GDP)

- Increased global debt market liquidity ensured a smooth rollover of maturing external debt in most of the economies under review in 2021
- Tightening global liquidity conditions, together with elevated risk aversion, in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, cloud the external financing outlook
- Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus will continue to benefit from increased flow of funds under the EU Recovery & Resilience Facility











Foreign exchange reserves

- FX reserves stand at adequate levels in all countries under review. Underlying pressures mostly reflect increased FX needs, on the back of higher global energy prices
- The picture is, however, misleading in the case of **Turkey**, where the CBRT has increased its borrowing from banks to replenish its FX reserve base, which has been eroded, following massive interventions in the FX market over the past years. Adjusted for the latter, Turkey's net FX reserves have turned negative



Short-term external debt-to-Foreign exchange reserves ratio (%)

Short-term external debt is comfortably covered by FX reserves in all countries under review, with the exception of Turkey and Romania



Balance of payments (12-month rolling, % of GDP)

- External imbalances are projected to widen in most of the economies under review this year, in line with **higher global commodity (especially energy) prices**
- For **Egypt, Cyprus** and to a lesser extent **Turkey**, which are highly dependent on tourism inflows from Russia and Ukraine, the adverse impact of the ongoing crisis on external accounts should be much more significant
- The **quality of external financing** is set to worsen in 2022, with non-debt generating foreign direct investments covering a smaller share of the current account deficit

Turkey	Dec. 20	Dec. 21	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F
Current account balance	-4.9	-1.8	-3.2	-1.7
Net FDI	0.6	0.9	0.9	1.0
Other net capital inflows *	0.4	2.6	1.2	1.2

Romania	Dec. 20	Dec. 21	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F
Current account balance	-5.0	-7.1	-6.8	-6.6
Net FDI	1.4	3.0	2.2	2.3
Other net capital inflows *	6.2	5.0	4.8	4.8

Bulgaria	Dec. 20	Dec. 21	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F
Current account balance	-0.3	-2.0	-2.5	-1.8
Net FDI	3.5	1.3	1.3	1.4
Other net capital inflows *	6.5	4.4	1.5	2.4

Serbia	Dec. 20	Dec. 21	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F
Current account balance	-4.1	-4.4	-4.7	-4.3
Net FDI	6.3	6.8	6.7	6.8
Other net capital inflows *	-1.3	0.5	-2.0	-2.3

North Macedonia	Dec. 20	Dec. 21	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F
Current account balance	-3.4	-3.5	-4.2	-3.0
Net FDI	1.5	3.7	3.4	3.5
Other net capital inflows *	5.6	8.7	5.0	5.5

Albania	Dec. 20	Dec. 21	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F
Current account balance	-8.8	-8.1	-7.9	-6.9
Net FDI	6.8	6.8	7.0	7.3
Other net capital inflows *	4.7	5.4	0.5	1.0

Cyprus	Dec. 20	Dec. 21E	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F
Current account balance	-10.1	-9.0	-11.4	-8.0
Net FDI **	17.9	19.9	24.0	28.9
Other net capital inflows *	4.3	-10.8	-12.6	-20.9










Egypt #	June 20	June 21	June 22F	June 23F
Current account balance	-3.1	-5.1	-4.2	-4.4
Net FDI	1.9	1.3	1.3	1.4
Other net capital inflows *	-3.8	4.3	3.2	3.4

** Gross in/out-flows related to financial SPEs are sizeable and volatile

*: excluding IMF and ESM funding and net errors and omissions, #: Fiscal year ending on June 30th










External debt (% of GDP)

- In most countries under review, **external debt rose further in 2021**, mainly driven by lending to the public sector to finance its policy response to the COVID-19 shock
- **External debt accumulation is expected to lose steam in 2022**, as global liquidity conditions begin to tighten












Real estate prices

- Amid accommodative credit conditions and abundant market liquidity, **real estate prices continued their upward trend in 2021** in most of the countries under review
- Nominal price pressures are set to remain elevated in the short-term, following, *inter alia*, the pass-through of the **ongoing increase in construction costs**
- Looking further ahead, **tighter monetary policy conditions** should eventually lead to a **cooling-down** in the real estate market




Inflation (%)

- Higher global energy prices and the impact of disruptions in global supply chains have pushed inflation to multi-year highs in all the economies under review
- The spike in global commodity (especially energy) prices, in the aftermath of the ongoing geopolitical tensions, and associated second-round effects are set to push inflation even higher in the period ahead, despite the measures put in place by the authorities (including price caps and subsidies)




Nominal effective exchange rate

▪ The TRY and the EGP have depreciated significantly in nominal terms over the past 6 years



Policy rate

With inflation due to rise further from already record high levels and pressures on domestic currencies building up, on the back, *inter alia*, of surging global risk aversion, **central banks cannot but tighten their stance** in the period ahead, despite strong downside risks to economic growth



Reserve requirement ratios

- In a bid to discourage dollarization, the Central Bank of **Turkey** hiked further its reserves requirement rates on FC liabilities


Turkey				Romania				Bulgaria			
Reserve Requirement Ratios (%)				Reserve Requirement Ratios (%)				Reserve Requirement Ratios (%)			
	Dec. 2020	Dec. 2021	Feb. 2022		Dec. 2020	Dec. 2021	Feb. 2022		Dec. 2020	Dec. 2021	Feb. 2022
LC Liabilities	1.0-6.0	3.0-8.0	3.0-8.0	LC Liabilities	8.0	8.0	8.0	LC Liabilities	10.0	10.0	10.0
FC Liabilities	13.0-19.0	19.0-26.0	19.0-26.0	FC Liabilities	5.0	5.0	5.0	FC Liabilities	5.0	5.0	5.0

Serbia				North Macedonia				Albania			
Reserve Requirement Ratios (%)				Reserve Requirement Ratios (%)				Reserve Requirement Ratios (%)			
	Dec. 2020	Dec. 2021	Feb. 2022		Dec. 2020	Dec. 2021	Feb. 2022		Dec. 2020	Dec. 2021	Feb. 2022
LC Liab.	0.0 - 5.0	0.0 - 5.0	0.0 - 5.0	LC Liabilities	8.0	8.0	8.0	LC Liabilities	5.0-7.5	5.0-7.5	5.0-7.5
FC Liab.	13.0 - 20.0	13.0 - 20.0	13.0 - 20.0	FC Liabilities	15.0	15.0	15.0	FC Liabilities	12.5-20.0	12.5-20.0	12.5-20.0

Cyprus				Egypt			
Reserve Requirement Ratios (%)				Reserve Requirement Ratios (%)			
	Dec. 2020	Dec. 2021	Feb. 2022		Dec. 2020	Dec. 2021	Feb. 2022
LC Liabilities	1.0	1.0	1.0	LC Liabilities	14.0	14.0	14.0
FC Liabilities	1.0	1.0	1.0	FC Liabilities	---	---	---

Fiscal performance (12-month rolling)

Fiscal accounts in all the countries under review improved in 2021, reflecting economic recovery and strong base effects from the collection of deferred taxes, on the one hand, and the gradual phasing-out of COVID-19-related support schemes, on the other hand



Fiscal balance (12-month rolling, % of GDP)

- **Fiscal consolidation is set to slow down in 2022** in most of the economies under review, so as to allow the budget to absorb part of the higher energy bill
- Benefitting from the ample fiscal space available, **Turkey** and **Bulgaria** stand ready to provide a significant fiscal stimulus
- **Fiscal balances are unlikely to revert to their pre-COVID-19 levels soon**

Turkey				Romania				Bulgaria			
Dec. 20	Dec. 21	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F	Dec. 20	Dec. 21	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F	Dec. 20	Dec. 21	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F
-3.4	-2.7	-3.8	-3.0	-9.6	-6.8	-6.0	-4.6	-2.9	-2.9	-4.5	-3.6










Serbia				North Macedonia				Albania			
Dec. 20	Dec. 21	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F	Dec. 20	Dec. 21	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F	Dec. 20	Dec. 21	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F
-8.0	-4.1	-4.0	-2.5	-8.2	-5.4	-5.4	-4.0	-6.8	-4.8	-4.8	-3.5

Cyprus				Egypt*			
Dec. 20	Dec. 21	Dec. 22F	Dec. 23F	Jun. 20	Jun. 21	Jun. 22F	Jun. 23F
-5.6	-1.8	-1.8	-1.2	-7.9	-7.4	-7.2	-6.5

*: Fiscal year ending on June 30th.


Public debt (% of GDP)

- The COVID-19 crisis has left all the economies under review with a **significant debt legacy**
- The **public debt-to-GDP ratios are set to rise further** in most the economies under review in 2022, albeit at a modest pace












Exchange rates

- Concerns over the consistency of the CBRT's policies, given the economy's vulnerabilities, led to (another) massive depreciation in the TRY in 2021
- Strong underlying pressures on the EGP, mainly reflecting "flight-to-quality", in the aftermath of the ongoing geopolitical tensions, prompted the CBE to allow the currency to depreciate markedly in March












Money market rates have risen from historical low levels in virtually all the countries under review, with the exception of Turkey, reflecting tightening liquidity conditions











Government debt yields (%)

▪ Rising inflation, together with expectation of tighter monetary policy conditions, have driven **debt yields higher**











Sovereign spreads (bps)

- Amid “flight-to-quality”, **sovereign spreads have widened markedly recently**, approaching the highs recorded at the outbreak of COVID-19
- Looking ahead, tightening global liquidity conditions do not bode well for the return of spreads to their pre-Russia-Ukraine crisis lows












Amid heightened uncertainty, stock markets have come off their recent highs












Total loans (y-o-y % change)

- Credit expansion strengthened in 2021 in most countries under review
- In Turkey, against the backdrop of a loose monetary policy stance, lending activity has been gaining momentum (again) lately











Total deposits (y-o-y % change)

Albeit slowing down, deposit growth continues to outpace lending growth in most of the countries under review












Total loans-to-GDP ratio (%)

All economies under review, except Cyprus, are still **underpenetrated in terms of lending**












FX loans-to-total loans ratio (%)

Banking systems' reliance on FX financing remains low in most of the countries under review












Total deposits-to-GDP ratio (%)

Amid rapidly rising inflation, the savings rate is expected to ease in the period ahead












FX deposits-to-total deposits ratio (%)

▪ The proportion of FX deposits in total deposits is higher than that for loans in most of the countries under review












Total loans-to-total deposits ratio (%)

• All banking systems under review enjoy a **loan-to-deposit ratio well below the 100% threshold**, with the exception of Turkey












Return-to-average equity ratio (% , cumulative and annualised)

- Reflecting an improving operating environment, the **profitability of the banking system** in most countries under review **improved** sharply in 2021, mainly in line with **lower provisioning**












Capital adequacy ratio (%)

Banking systems in all countries under review remain **well-capitalised**



Non-performing loans ratio (%)

- **Solvency pressures have been limited** so far, despite the expiration of forbearance measures (incl. debt moratoria) taken to alleviate the impact of COVID-19
- The implications of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis on asset quality should not be significant, in view of the **minimal direct financial exposure** of the banking systems under review to these countries



- A **strong foreign presence** in Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Serbia

Foreign Ownership (% of Total Assets, Dec. 2021)							
Turkey	Romania	Bulgaria	Serbia	North Macedonia	Albania	Cyprus ^a	Egypt ^b
21.6	68.2	77.0	86.3	65.6	69.0	21.1	55.0

^a: 30.06.2019

^b: 31.12.2015

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